Identity and authorization in voice agents: accessing personal records
Place authorization in the external service and use the prompt to guide verification.
- Author
- Tigy AI team
- Published
- Updated
Identifying a caller establishes who is requesting service; authorization permits a specific operation on a resource. A name, phone number or order reference stated during conversation does not establish both. For Tigy AI voice agents, instructions guide questions and respect refusals; the external integration must validate identity and access before returning records or performing changes.
Classify information
Separate public information, request status and personal records. Define fields allowed after each verification level. An order may need only a summarized status without addresses, documents or complete history.
Validate at the destination
Your service must validate identity and scope before returning records. Bind authorization to the permitted resource and externally verified context. A tool’s technical credential authenticates the service; it does not prove caller identity.
Write agent instructions
Request only the necessary reference and explain the approved verification step. Use the configured tool after required inputs are available. If access is denied, explain that verification failed and offer the approved channel; do not bypass rejection by changing the request.
Minimize tool output
Return clear states such as authorized, unverified or unavailable, with only permitted fields. Do not expose secrets, session tokens or account-discovery details. The exact policy belongs to the external system and accountable team.
Test real rejection
Use fictional details to test an authorized request, another person’s request, expired authorization and an unavailable service. Ask the integration owner to check which information the system sent and compare it with what the agent said. Restricted information must not appear even when a caller insists.
Why does a tool credential not identify the caller?
The key used by a tool lets the connection access a service. It does not prove that the person on the phone may view every record available in that service. The responsible system must check who the caller is and which information or changes they may request.
In a fictional example, a tool has technical access to store orders but the caller is authorized only for DEMO-71. Access to DEMO-17 should be refused without revealing its data. Test that pair using synthetic records and inspect the response body as well as the spoken refusal.
Separate locating a person from authorizing an operation
Locating a record and authorizing access are different decisions. A telephone number, name, or reference may help find a record, but does not by itself establish that the caller may view all its information or change it. Define which evidence is sufficient for each operation. A public question may require no verification; an individual lookup or profile change may require additional criteria.
At a fictional store, a number locates an order, but the system still needs to check whether the caller may access it. Knowing that number does not prove the purchase is theirs. Agree on which details the agent asks for and ask the integration owner to verify access before supplying information.
Do not ask for extra details simply to create a feeling of security. Define which information the system actually checks. Questions that are not part of verification make service harder and collect unnecessary details. Prefer an approved, verifiable procedure for each type of action.
Represent results separately: record located, verification completed, and operation permitted. This helps the agent interpret responses without skipping stages. If verification fails, explain the defined alternative without revealing details the person may not yet access. If the record is missing, explain that it could not be located using supplied information rather than asserting the person is not a customer. Wording should reflect what the system actually established. A familiar name or a confident statement from the caller should not silently change that state.
Treat initial context as information, not universal permission
Context available before a conversation may reduce repetition and help identify the need. It should not be treated as universal authorization. An identifier supplied through the call channel may have a specific scope, and a populated variable may be incorrect or outdated. The integration should define how that context relates to verified identity and which operations it permits.
In a fictional example, a call begins with an account reference, but the caller says they are contacting the company about another site. The agent can hear the correction and understand the request. That does not make the new reference authorized merely because it was mentioned. Apply the corresponding verification. Using the initial account for another site can return incorrect information; accepting every correction as permission can improperly expand access.
Separate identification from preference. A caller can change a preferred time without changing their verified identity. Ask the connection owner to check that the agent can only consult the authorized record. The key connecting the systems should not let it freely choose any customer.
Test missing context, invalid references, unknown originating numbers, and people claiming to represent other customers. The operation should define expected outcomes. The agent can continue providing public information and legitimate alternatives when individual lookup is not permitted. Preserving usefulness does not require opening access; it requires explaining the boundary and performing only actions authorized at that stage of the conversation. Review whether a caller correction changes the requested case correctly while leaving authorization checks intact.
Make the server check identity against the requested resource
Instructions guide the agent, but the system supplying or changing information must enforce access. Ask the integration owner to check that requests about another person are refused even if the agent selects the wrong record. Verbal confirmation alone does not protect individual information.
Consider a fictional system where two accounts have orders with similar references. A tool should verify the requested purchase within authorized scope rather than return any order matching the number. If an identifier changes after correction, verification should follow the new resource. Validating the person once does not mean every later identifier can be queried without a relationship to that verification. Test corrections as a potential access-boundary case, not only as a transcription-quality case.
Limit returned fields to the task. A state lookup need not provide complete payment information or details about other contacts. Return what is necessary to guide the caller and a clear state for interpretation. Smaller relevant responses also simplify explanation. Tools returning many unrelated details increase the chance of excessive disclosure or unnecessary circulation in summaries. Review both spoken answers and downstream records for that effect.
For changes, validate the action and current state as well. Permission to read does not imply permission to write. A closed request may not accept a particular modification. Return an outcome distinguishing success, rejection, and pending state. The agent should explain it accurately rather than try another tool to bypass a rejection. Authorization should hold when callers rephrase, demand urgency, or claim that somebody else already approved access. External enforcement is the layer that makes these boundaries dependable even when conversational interpretation is imperfect.
Test permitted and prohibited access in pairs
Authorization review needs cases where service should work and cases where it must be blocked. Testing only the correct account establishes usefulness but not isolation. Testing only prohibited requests may produce an agent that refuses everything. For each operation, prepare a pair with the same request type and a meaningful difference in identity or resource.
For a fictional order lookup, the first case uses the authorized account and corresponding reference. The second attempts access to another account's order. Include corrected references, callers representing others, and context mismatched to the request. Specify what the server should return and what the agent may say. A verbal refusal is insufficient if the tool already received or exposed unauthorized information. Check action evidence rather than evaluating only the final sentence.
For writes, test permitted changes, edits to another profile, and attempts after state changes. Inspect external records to determine whether a write happened. The agent may report failure even though an action occurred, or announce success without a change. These mismatches show why integration evidence is necessary alongside transcripts. A protective-sounding conversation does not establish that the resource remained unchanged.
Record the instructions, tool setup and test scenario. After a correction, repeat both allowed and prohibited requests. Changes to the connection or access require another check. Do not hide an unauthorized disclosure in an average success rate: the authorized customer should receive service and requests about another person should be refused.
Keep a useful alternative when verification is insufficient
When the agent cannot authorize lookup, it can still explain public information and the real procedure for obtaining service. Describe the boundary without revealing protected details. “I could not verify the access needed to check this order” explains the limit; listing account details to help someone guess answers may increase the exposure verification is meant to prevent.
Define a route for legitimate callers unable to complete the required step. That may involve a particular channel, human review, or another approved procedure. The alternative must exist and must not turn claimed urgency into automatic authorization. Acknowledge the difficulty without performing the blocked action. Continuity should resolve the case through the right process rather than circumvent the rule. Staff receiving it need to know that authorization was not established.
If the integration is unavailable, distinguish technical failure from rejected verification. The customer may be authorized but the system cannot confirm it. Explain the inability to verify at that moment and offer an existing route. Do not announce that the caller lacks permission when lookup simply failed to respond. This distinction also helps the responsible team investigate the correct kind of issue and avoids misleading customers about their relationship with the company.
In operational review, track authorized requests requiring recollection, technical failures, and out-of-scope attempts separately. Preserve minimal evidence for investigation. If a procedure causes unnecessary blocks, review it with the access owner instead of teaching the agent to ignore it. The desired boundary is clear: public information remains accessible, individual lookup requires verification, and changes require appropriate permission. Within that boundary, the agent can remain courteous, direct, and useful even when it must explain that an action cannot be confirmed. Review both excessive refusals and unauthorized success rather than optimizing only one side.
